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PARTIES
The Children:
S. H., born July 30, 1985. She is the seventeen yearold daughter of the Appellant.
R.D., born September 9, 1988. She is the fourteen
year-old daughter of the Appellant
T.D., born November 23, 1990. He is the twelve yearold son of the Appellant.
P.D., born April 14, 1994. He is the nine year-old son
of the Appellant.
The Parent:
L.D., "the Mother." She is the Mother of the above
Children She is appealing the termination of her parental
rights.
The Agencies:
Division of Child and Family Services, "the
Division" or "DCFS." The Division was the petitioner
below and is the appellee in the present case.
Office of the Guardian ad Litem, "the Guardian."
The juvenile court appointed the Guardian to represent the
best interests of the minor children.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH
In the interest of
S.H., R.D., T.D., & P.D.,
Children under eighteen
years of age.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
L.D.,
Appellant.

CaseNo.20030191-CA
Priority No. 4

GUARDIAN ad LITEM'S BRIEF

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(c) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-909.

ISSUES FOR REVIEW
1. Whether the 2002 Amendments apply to the petition. This is an issue of law
which this Court reviews for correctness. In re T.M., 2003 UT App 191, f 20.

2. Whether an appellant may raise a claim on appeal when the appellant has
waived that claim. Absent plain error, this Court has declined to consider claims that
have not been preserved. In re T.M.. 2003 UT App 191, If 24 n.4; Hart v. Salt Lake Co.
Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah App. 1997).
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STATUTES, RULES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407.

STATEMENT OF CASE
Nature of Case: The Mother appeals an order terminating her parental rights.

Course of Proceedings: The Children were removed twice. First in 1997 and then
in May of 2001. R.12, 26-29. In March 2002, the Division petitioned to terminate her
parental rights. R.77-83. After four days of trial on the merits, the juvenile court
convened with parties in chambers and announced a stipulated agreement. Pursuant to
the agreement, the Mother entered admissions on the record to each allegation in the
petition that related to her. The court then deferred entering the admissions pending an
additional sixty days of services to the Mother. The court provided in the event that the
Mother failed to comply with services, any party could move the court to enter her
admissions. R.259-66, September 29, 2002 tr. 631-45, R.340. See Appendix A.

Pursuant to the Guardian ad Litem's motion, the juvenile court convened a hearing
in December 2002 to hear evidence to determine whether it should enter the Mother's
admission to the termination petition.
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Disposition at Trial: After an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the court found the
evidence to be sufficient to determine the Mother had not complied with the terms of the
agreement. The court then entered the Mother's admissions to the termination petition.
December 23, 2002 tr. 65-69, R.336. See Appendix B. R.322-31. The Mother appeals
the termination order. R.332.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves the stability and welfare of four Children, ages seventeen,
fourteen, twelve and nine. They have been twice removed from the Mother. The Mother
was criminally convicted once for abuse of the oldest child and once for abuse of the
child who is now twelve. R.3-6, 27.

In May 2001, when the Mother was on probation for two earlier convictions of
criminal child abuse, she was seen battering the ten year-old in public. R.27. The
Children were placed in the custody of the Division, but the order was stayed on a day-today basis and the Children were returned to the Mother. R.26-29, 43. The juvenile court
adjudicated a neglect and abuse petition against the Mother. R.61-62, Appendix A. at
634. Two months later, the Mother's probation was revoked, and the juvenile court lifted
its stay and the Children were again removed from the Mother's care while she served 60
days of a 365-day sentence. R.64-66.
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By September 2001, the Mother was out of jail and resumed accumulating
referrals and substantiations for child abuse. R.67, Appendix at 634. The Mother was
held in contempt of court and was sentenced to jail for five days. R.70.

The Mother's probation was again revoked and she was ordered to serve the
remainder of the sentence for violating a no contact order in place to protect the Children.
Appendix A. at 635. In February of 2002, the juvenile court terminated reunification
services. R.75-76. In March 2002, the Division petitioned to terminate the Mother's
parental rights. R.77-83.

After four days of trial on the merits, the juvenile court met with all parties in
chambers. The court announced on the record that the parties had "reluctantly" come to a
stipulated settlement. Appendix at 631-45.

As part of the settlement, the Mother admitted on the record to each paragraph of
the petition that pertained to her. The Mother admitted to grounds for termination,
reasonable efforts by the Division, and best interests.

The Mother admitted that "the state has attempted to provide you with numerous
reunification services since the adjudication of the shelter petition on the children. The
State has provided you with a DCFS caseworker, service plans, a psychological
20030191-CA
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examination, referrals for treatment, therapeutic visitation, appointed legal counsel."
Appendix A at 636. The Mother admitted that she had failed to comply with these
services. Id.

The court then asked the Mother what would happen if she didn't comply with the
treatment plan. The Mother responded: "I will lose my family." Id. at 638. "For how
long?" the court asked. "For the rest of my life." Id. The court emphasized, "it is
important that you understand that there won't be another trial, there won't be another
review of all the evidence." Id. at 639.

The juvenile court then deferred entering the Mother's admission for sixty days
while the Mother would be required to comply with a service plan. The Mother's
noncompliance would result in the court entering her admissions to the termination
petition.

When the Mother demonstrated noncompliance with every aspect of the plan, the
Guardian ad Litem moved the court for an evidentiary hearing on the question of whether
the court should enter the Mother's admission to the termination petition. R.286-89.
After an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the court ruled from the bench finding the
Mother did not comply with the terms of the treatment plan. Therefore it was appropriate
to enter her admission to the termination petition. Appendix B at 65-69.
20030191-CA
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At the hearing, the juvenile court conceded that its purpose in deferring admission
of the Mother's earlier admissions to the petition was not entirely focused on the
Children's best interests:
The concern that the Court had during the prior
adjudication was not so much the best interests as it pertains
to the children as it was the fact that the mother had only been
in jail for a short period of time and I wasn't sure she'd had a
fair shot at being able to comply with the service plan.
Id. at 65.

The court noted that, at the earlier termination hearing, it had interviewed the
Children and that "none of the children expressed to the Court a desire to return home
under the current circumstances, with the mother functioning the way that she was." The
court found that the Children "had been abused emotionally, and were in a very sad and
very deplorable and neglectful condition, in terms of their anxieties and their emotional
stress. . . . The Court also found that the children had thrived in foster care." Id. at 66.

The court also noted that the Mother had had almost twice the sixty-day time limit
that had been contemplated. Id. The court then concluded that the Mother had failed in
"every regard" of the treatment plan. Id. at 66-67. The court then accepted and entered
the Mother's admission to the termination petition. Id. at 68-69. The court entered
written findings and order to the effect. R.322-31. The Mother appeals the termination
order. R.332.
20030191-CA
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Mother, having on the record and upon the advice of counsel, entered her
admission to the termination petition. Included in her admission were admissions going
to grounds, best interests and the Division's efforts to provide her with services. The
Mother also agreed to the terms of the sixty-day extension of services.

Given those admissions, the Mother has waived all claims going to reasonable
efforts. She has also waived all claims going to the juvenile court's power to enter her
admissions and to terminate her parental rights.

Moreover, the Mother enjoyed an additional four months of services to which she
was not legally entitled.

This Court should therefore affirm the termination order.

ARGUMENT
1. THE 2002 AMENDMENTS DO NOT APPLY TO THE PETITION.
The Mother claims that the 2002 amendment to section 78-3a-407, requiring
terminating courts to find reasonable efforts by the Division, applies to the present
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petition even though* the petition was filed prior to the effective date of the statute. See
Mother's Brief at 15-20.

The Legislature amended section 78-3a-407 such that a terminating court, prior to
terminating a parents' rights on specified grounds, must make findings going to
reasonable efforts, where services had earlier been ordered. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a407. This Courl has held that the amendment is not retroactive and applies only to those
termination petitions filed after May 6, 2002, the effective date of the statute. In re TJVL
2003 UTApp 191,1[ 20.

The Mother concedes this point, see Mother's Brief at 15, but claims that
services ordered after the effect date of the statute somehow constituted a new petition
and, therefore, the 2002 amendment applies. Id. at 18 ("The trial court then commenced
a new action by ordering DCFS to provide a sixty (60) day service plan to Appellant.").
This claim ignores the fact that no new termination petition was filed after the effective
date of the amendment.

Moreover, much of the Mother's argument centers on the legality of the trial
court's extension of reunification services after grounds were established. The juvenile
court's extension of services, after grounds were found and after twelve months had
elapsed since removal, was legally unwarranted. In a case involving the same juvenile
20030191-CA
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judge, this Court emphasized that "our juvenile courts lack the authority to stay an order
terminating a parents' rights, and that such a stay is contrary to the stated goals of our
child welfare laws." InreSJU 1999 UT App 390, If 40, 995 P.2d 17.

In SJL, the juvenile court had entered the termination order and had stayed on a
day-to-day basis while the Mother received reunification services. In the present case,
the same juvenile judge court accepted the Mother's admission to the petition (including
admissions going to best interests), but stayed entry of the admissions for a sixty-day
period while the Mother received reunification services. Appendix A at 637-38.

In the present case, the Children were removed July 16, 2001. R.64. Thus, the
Children were entitled to permanency and the Mother was disentitled to any services after
July 16, 2002. On September 29, 2002, fourteen months after the Children's removal, the
juvenile court extended reunification services by another sixty days. The Mother, having
received the benefit of the court's extra-legal extension of services, cannot not claim that
the court entered a "new" action and thus she is entitled to yet another finding of
reasonable efforts.

Finally, the Mother stipulated to a finding going to reasonable efforts. That is, on
September 29, 2002, the date the Mother stipulated to the termination petition, the
Mother admitted on the record that "the State has attempted to provide you with
20030191-CA
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numerous reunification services since the adjudication of the shelter petition on the
children. The State has provided you with a DCFS caseworker, service plans, a
psychological examination, referrals for treatment, therapeutic visitation, appointed legal
counsel." Appendix A at 636.

In short, Ihe Mother's claim has no merit because the termination petition was
filed prior the effective date of the 2002 amendment and because the Mother stipulated to
a finding going to reasonable efforts and because the Division's efforts went beyond
reason, because they extended beyond the twelve-month period allowable under the law.
For these reasons, this Court should affirm the termination order.

2. THE MOTHER HAS WAIVED ALL CLAIMS
ARISING FROM THE TERMINATION ORDER.

The Mother claims the juvenile court was without discretion to enter the
termination order based on her performance of the sixty-day service plan that was put in
place after she admitted to the petition. See Mother's Brief at 21-26.

This Court has previously declined to consider whether a stipulated agreement,
similar to the present one, might be invalid as a matter of law where the parents did not
preserve the issue. In re T.M.. 2003 UT App 191, Tf 24 n.4.
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Here, the Mother admitted to every aspect of the termination petition including
grounds, best interests, and reasonable efforts. Appendix at 631-45. Moreover, in the
December 2002 hearing to determine whether the court should enter the Mother's
admissions, the Mother never raised the issue that the court had no discretion to
termination her rights. Counsel for Mother asked only for leave to continue on the
service plan. Appendix B at 65.

This Court should decline to consider the Mother's claim because she waived it
when she admitted to the termination petition and because she never preserved it for
appeal.

See Hart v. Salt Lake Co. Comm'n. 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah App. 1997).

This Court should therefore affirm the termination order.

3. THE JUVENILE COURT FOUND REASONABLE EFFORTS.
The Mother claims the juvenile court failed to find that the Division made
reasonable efforts at the time it entered the termination order. See Mother's Brief at 2629.

As addressed above, the 2002 amendment did not apply to the termination petition
because the petition was filed prior to the effective date of the amendment. As addressed
above, the Mother stipulated to the fact that the Division provided reasonable services.
20030191-CA
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Appendix A at 636. Finally, at the December 23, 2002 hearing to determine whether the
Court should enter the Mother's admission to the termination petition, counsel for Mother
never objected to the nature of the services, nor did he argue that services were not
reasonable. Instead, he said he was "simply asking this Court to allow my client to
continue on the service plan." Appendix B at 65.

Given the Mother's admissions, she has waived any claim going to the reasonable
of services, even if the statute did apply, which it did not. See Hart v. Salt Lake Co.
Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah App. 1997) (absent plain error, a party must preserve
a claim for this Court to consider it on appeal). This Court should therefore affirm the
termination order.

ORAL ARGUMENT: PUBLICATION OF OPINION
The Guardian ad Litem does not request oral argument or a published opinion
because the Mother raises no issues of merit.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Guardian moves this court to affirm the juvenile
court's termination order.
DATED this 22nd day of July 2003.

MARTHA PIERCE V .
Guardian ad Litem
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of July 2003,1 caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, two true and exact copies of the Guardian ad Litem's Brief to:
John M. Peterson
Carol L.C. Verdoia
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Gary L. Bell
254 West 400 South, Suite 320
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

MARTHA PIERCE
Guardian ad Litem
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APPENDIX
A. Transcript of Admission to Termination Petition. September 29, 2002, R.340,
Tr.631-45.
B. Transcript of Entry of Admission. December 23, 2002, R.336, Tr.65-69.
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APPENDIX A
September 29, 2002 Transcript. R. 340, Tr.631-45.

1
2

THE COURT:
I

Let me see counsel in chambers.

(A brief recess.)

3

(Proceedings resume at 3:50 p.m.)

4

THE BAILIFF:

5

Hartwell-DeLong children.

6
7

Back on the record in the

THE COURT:

Well, we appreciate everybodyfs patience,

J the record should reflect that theref s been an extensive

8

conference in chambers between all of the attorneys and I think

9

we've arrived at an alternative disposition which doesn't make

10

everybody happy, but I think that everybody has agreed that it

11

is a —

12

reservations, I think they feel like it will meet the ultimate

an acceptable way to proceed.

Though each person has

13

I needs and the best interests of the children.

14

J in agreement that this is probably a solution to a very

15

difficult situation that will in the long run meet the

16

interests of the children, regardless of how it comes out.

17

And the Court is

Mr. Angley, you were going to discuss with your

18

client her willingness to admit the petition today.

In

19

exchange for which, if she did admit the petition, that she

20

would be given approximately 60 days to demonstrate 100 percent

21

compliance with the service plan to be drafted by the Division

22

of Family Services.

That arrangement is based on your

23

I understanding, and Ifm sure your representation to her is based

24

I on the evidence I thought there might be grounds to terminate

25

I her parental rights.

But based on best interests of the

1

children, I was more concerned about whether that was in their

2

best interest at this point based on their comments.

3

Also I was concerned that she had been in jail

4

before.

5

eight months in jail, three weeks out of jail.

6

would give me an opportunity to see if she was genuinely

7

sincere about the changes she says she has made.

8

genuinely benefited from all the classes that she took while

9

she was in jail.

10
11
12
13

She *s only been out for a very brief period of time,
And that this

And if she's

Is that your understanding, sir?

MR. ANGLEY:

That is, your Honor.

And that is what I

represented to my client.
THE COURT: Would you be kind enough to do a Boiken
with her then on the petition and process her admission.

14

MR. ANGLEY:

15

Ms. DeLong, you have gone over the petition to

16
17

Sure. Where is it?

terminate your parental rights with me?
THE COURT: Ms. DeLong, pull that microphone up real

18

close to you.

19

us so we will pick it up.

20

want to make sure we get everything you say.

And, ma'am, would you speak up big and loud for
You have kind of a soft voice and I

21

MS. DeLONG:

Okay.

22

MR. ANGLEY:

You have gone over this verified

23

petition for termination of parental rights with me?

24

MS. DeLONG:

Yes, I have.

25

MR. ANGLEY:

Okay.

And first of all, you are not

1

under the influence of any drugs or alcohol or anything that

2

would impair your thinking today?

3
4

1

5
6

right —

MS. DeLONG:

No, Ifm not.

MR. ANGLEY:

Okay.

And you know that you have the

we have started a trial in this petition, you have the

J right to continue this trial and conclude the trial and submit

7

this to the judge for a decision, correct?

8

MS. DeLONG:

Yes.

9

MR. ANGLEY:

And that includes your right to present

10

witnesses, which we have done, cross-examine witnesses, testify

11

on your own behalf, or refuse to do so.

12

your own behalf in this case?

13
14

I

You have testified on

MS. DeLONG:

I have.

MR. ANGLEY:

And if you admitted the petition, as

15

we're doing right now, you are waiving any further rights you

16

have to a trial on this petition, correct?

17
18

I

MS. DeLONG:

Yes.

MR. ANGLEY:

Okay.

As far as this petition goes, I f m

19

going to walk through it with you and I want you to indicate

20

whether you admit the individual allegations in this petition.

21

J

Paragraph 1, that this Court does have jurisdiction

22

I and venue is proper given that you and the children reside in

23

I Salt Lake County.

Do you admit that?

24

MS. DeLONG:

Yes.

25

MR. ANGLEY:

Paragraph 2, Sara Hartwell, Rebecca

1

DeLong, Taylor DeLong, and Phillip DeLong are in the custody of

2

the Division and are the natural children of yourself?

3

MS. DeLONG:

Yes.

4

MR. ANGLEY:

You admit that?

6

MS. DeLONG:

I admit that.

7

MR. ANGLEY:

Paragraph 3, Taylor DeLong adjudicated

5

Please say the word

admit.

8

as an abused child and Phillip, Rebecca and Sara adjudicated as

9

neglected on July 3 r d ' 2001.

10

MS. DeLONG:

I admit that.

11

MR. ANGLEY:

Four, these children have been in the

12

custody and guardianship of the Division since July 16 t h , 2001

13

due to the incarceration of yourself following your criminal

14

conviction for physically abusing Taylor.

15

of a one-year sentence and were released on probation.

16

admit that?

You served 60 days
Do you

17

MS. DeLONG:

I admit that.

18

MR. ANGLEY:

Paragraph 5, you have failed to comply

19

with either the criminal court's orders regarding contact with

20

the children or this Court's records regarding visitation and

21

contact with your children.

22

contact with the children outside the boundaries set forth for

23

your visitation.

You have consistently attempted

Do you admit that?

24

MS. DeLONG:

I admit that.

25

MR. ANGLEY:

Six, Taylor has required hospitalization

1

due to his fragile emotional state.

Taylor's condition has

2

been exacerbated by contact with yourself.

3

ignored orders not to attempt contact directly with Taylor.

4

December 2001 you ignored DCFS and Taylorfs therapist's

5

directives not to contact or attempt to contact Taylor and made

You have repeatedly

6

J repeated telephone calls to Taylor at Primary Children's

7

J residential unit.

8

Taylor's response to these calls was to

start cutting on himself and an attempt to hang himself.

9

J calls stopped —

10

I you admit that?

The

the calls stopped when you were arrested.

11

MS. DeLONG:

Yes, I admit that.

12

MR. ANGLEY:

In January 2002, Judge Christiansen

13

revoked your probation for your violation of the no contact

14

order and imposed 305 days left of your jail sentence.

15

admit that?
MS. DeLONG:

Yes, I admit that.

17

MR. ANGLEY:

Paragraph 8, the children are doing

I better in their placements without contact from you?

19

Do

Do you

16

18

In

Do you

admit that?

20

MS. DeLONG:

I admit that.

MR. ANGLEY:

Nine, according to your psychological

21

I

22

J evaluation, you have no insight into your behavior and present

23

J a physical and emotional risk to your children.

24
25

that?
MS. DeLONG:

I admit that.

Do you admit

1
2

MR. ANGLEY:

Paragraph 10 does not apply to you.

Paragraph 11 does not apply to you.

3

Paragraph 12, the State has attempted to provide you

4

with numerous reunification services since the adjudication of

5

the shelter petition on the children.

6

you with a DCFS caseworker, service plans, a psychological

7
8

The State has provided

I examination, referrals for treatment, therapeutic visitation,
appointed legal counsel.

Do you admit that?

9

MS. DeLONG:

I admit that.

10

MR. ANGLEY:

Thirteen, you have failed to comply with

11

J the terms of your service plan and failed to comply with the

12

I terms of your probation.

Do you admit that?

13

MS. DeLONG:

I admit that.

14

MR. ANGLEY:

Fourteen, and final paragraph, Sara is

15

I in Odyssey House and the other children are placed in separate

16

placements where their special needs are being met.

17

children all have appropriate contact with each other and their

18

J behaviors have improved.

The

It is in the best interest of the

19

children to maintain this arrangement inasmuch as there were no

20

suitcible relative placements available to take the children as

21

la sibling group.

Do you admit that?

22

MS. DeLONG:

Yes, I admit that.

23

MR. ANGLEY:

Fourteen, that's the entirety of the

24
25

J petition.
THE COURT:

Ms. DeLong, I want to talk to you just a

1

little bit on the record now.

2

MS. DeLONG:

3

THE COURT:

Okay.
Do you understand, ma'am, that by

4

admitting the petition the Court does have the discretion to

5

J terminate all of your parental rights, title and interest to

6

J all the children, do you understand that?

7

MS. DeLONG:

8

THE COURT:

9

Yes, I do.
Okay.

All of the parties have agreed,

although I have to tell you that they've done it reluctantly

10

for one reason or another, have agreed to this matter

11

continuing for an additional 60 days.

12

that you had been in jail for a long time.

13

with the classes that you took.

14

Sometimes people in jail take classes because there's nothing

15

else to do, better than sitting in your cell.

16

take them because it helps them get out of jail.

17

looks favorably on people taking classes.

18

I was a little concerned
I was impressed

I was glad that you did that.

Sometimes people
The judge

And some mothers

I take them because they really want to improve their

19

relationship with their kids.

I couldn't tell which one it was

20

J with you because I haven't been able to see how you've done

21

I with the kids since you've been out of jail.

22

I

23

I early.

24

J noticed.

25

J very attentive to everything that's been said.

I am impressed that you've always been in court very
You've arrived here about an hour early today I
You've been very appropriate in court.

You've been
You've

1

cooperated with your attorney.

You've answered all of the

2

questions.

3

it's going to be a real tight service plan.

4

that it will be a tight service plan?

So I want you to have this additional time.

5

MS. DeLONG:

6

THE COURT:

But

Do you understand

Yes, I do.
Okay.

Any disobedience to the service

7

plan, any disobedience, any mistakes, failing to follow my

8

order in any way, any of that could result either in

9

Ms. McDonald, who is the attorney for the children, or

10

Miss Page, who is the attorney for the State, filing a motion

11

and in that motion they just have to show mom didn't do this

12

paragraph of the service plan.

13

have the right then to accept your admission and terminate your

14

parental rights.

15

service plan?

So is it important for you to follow the

16

MS. DeLONG:

17

THE COURT:

18

MS. DeLONG:

19

THE COURT:

20

And if they show that, I would

Yes, it is.
Why?
Not only for myself, but for my family.
And what will happen if you don't follow

the service plan?

21

MS. DeLONG:

22

THE COURT:

23

MS. DeLONG:

24

THE COURT:

25

MS. DeLONG:

I will lose my family.
For how long?
For the rest of my life.
And you don't want to do that, do you?
No.

1
2

THE COURT:

I don't want that to happen either.

I want you and the kids to be together.

I

I want them to get over

3

their problems and I want you to be able to improve your

4

parenting skills so that this never comes back to haunt you

5

again.

6

wonf t be another trial, there won't be another review of all

7

But it is important that you understand that there

I the evidence.

All there will be is either a successful return

8

of the kids or a ruling on a motion for a failure to comply

9

with the service plan, the new service plan, okay?

10

MS. DeLONG:

11

THE COURT:

Okay.
The restraining order remains in effect.

12

That means that you are, at least for right now, you are not

13

allowed to have any contact with the kids.

14

MS. DeLONG:

15

THE COURT:

Do you understand?

Yes, I do.
Supposing you start making phone calls to

16

hospitals or therapists or schools or foster families, what do

17

you think I would do?

18

MS. DeLONG:

19

THE COURT:

20

MS. DeLONG:

21

THE COURT:

22

Terminate right then.
Yeah.

You understand that?

Uh-huh.
Supposing you started missing therapy,

I what would happen?

23

MS. DeLONG:

Terminate.

24

THE COURT:

That f s right.

25

Or if you lost your job,

J or if you lost your apartment, or if you started using drugs,

1

or heaven forbid if you allowed yourself to get hooked up with

2

another man who was mean to you, all of those could be a basis

3

for termination of parental rights, couldn't they?

4

MS. DeLONG:

5

THE COURT:

Yes, it could.
The other one, this is a little more

6

difficult, I have a lot of people that go to therapy, sometimes

7

they don't make progress in therapy.

8

they are ordered to go.

9

from 2:00 to 3:00, so they see their therapist every Wednesday

Some people go because

I'm supposed to go every Wednesday

10

from 2:00 to 3:00, that isn't success.

11

for you to understand what the therapist is saying and to

12

incorporate that into your life and to use that in terms of

13

communicating and raising your children.

14

termination of parental rights would be if you were not making

15

progress, significant progress over the next 60 days in

16

therapy.

17

me.

18

have that much time, but the law doesn't permit me to do that.

19

The legislature has said you only have a short period of time

20

to give these kids permanency.

21

make every one of your therapy appointments unless you are just

22

dieing of a disease, then you would have to have a doctor's

23

excuse, okay?

Success will require

So another basis for

I'd like to go out longer but the law won't permit

I wish I could go 90 days or 180 days so that you would

24

MS. DeLONG:

25

THE COURT:

So it's very important that you

Right.
Every one of your therapy appointments,

1

right?

2

MS. DeLONG:

3

THE COURT:

Right.
And then learn it and take it in and

4

understand it so that you can demonstrate it later if and when

5

you start seeing your children.

6

MS. DeLONG:

7

THE COURT:

Will you do that?

I will.
You are to have no contact with the

8

children, no phone calls, none to their schools, their

9

hospitals, no direct or indirect contact of any way until you

10

have the permission of the Court, that's me, okay?

11

MS. DeLONG:

12

THE COURT:

I understand.
Okay.

I want you to be gainfully

13

employed.

14

social worker and the therapist can decide if any additional

15

classes beyond that are needed.

16
17

I want you to do individual therapy.

And then the

She's taken a bunch already, but if you think those
are necessary, we'll build those into the service plan.

18

MS. McDONALD:

Your Honor, I think an additional

19

portion of the service plan that Miss DeLong might want to be

20

aware of, it's always been part of the service plan, I don't

21

think it's ever been completed, is a medical evaluation for a

22

psychotropic drug that may

23

THE COURT:

—

Will you go see a doctor —

in fact, I

24

think what I'm going to do is ask the Division to help her get

25

set up.

I'm not sure she'll know how to go about doing this.

1

I Will you help her get set up, go through the phone book, find

2

someone that takes the insurance or Medicaid that she has and

3

J get her set up with an appropriate psychiatrist who can decide

4

I whether or not medications are needed,

5

J

6

I If title doctor says they're not needed, then you don't need to

7

J worry about it.

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

If they are needed, I would expect you to take them.

But you have to do what the doctor says to do.

Will you do that?
MS. DeLONG:
THE COURT:

I will.
I need the Division to actually help her

with that, though.
MS. ZAHN:

Do you mean the form of payment or just in

the form of hooking her up.
THE COURT:

Let's start with hooking her up first, to

15

get her the right person.

16

since this is a termination proceeding I would even expect the

17

If there is an issue of payment,

J Division to at least initiate and help in that area as well.

18

I'm hoping through her employment she'll have insurance, if not

19

I'm hoping Medicaid will assist or that Valley Mental Health

20

will be there to provide some assistance.

21

anything administrative to be a barrier to a legitimate need.

22

MS. McDONALD:

I don't want

And, your Honor, there may be

23

additional requirements of the service plan, those will all

24

become part of the Court order; is that correct?

25

there were things such as random UA's contained in her old

For example,

service plan, I think thatfs still

1
2
3

THE COURT:

Let's address that right now.

I very excellent insight.

4

MS. DeLONG:

5

THE COURT:

6

MS. DeLONG:

—

You can't use any drugs.

I understand.
And you won't do it, will you?
No, I won't.

7

J

THE COURT:

8

J either.

I need you to be fresh and focused, okay?

9

MS. DeLONG:

10

THE COURT:

There's

Right now I don't want you using alcohol

Okay.
What did I miss, Mollie?

Did you suggest

11

I something else?

12

J

13

I discussed and I discussed with my client already as far as who

MR. ANGLEY:

Your Honor, there was one other thing we

14

the therapist will be.

That as we all know she currently has

15

started in Cornerstone, but that will not be the appropriate

16

J therapist.

17

J

18

I don't use them for these kinds of matters.

19

THE COURT:

I use Cornerstone for drug issues, I
They're good.

The

therapist has to be somebody who is approved by Ms. McDonald

20

I and Ms. Page.

They know lots of good therapists.

Once again,

21

J the Division has the affirmative responsibility to pick out and

22

I select and get approval of these two attorneys for a particular

23

J therapist.

24

J for her first appointment.

25

I list, I want her to have some hand holding to get her in for

Sit down with her, make a phone call, get her in
I don't want you just to give her a

1
2

that first appointment.
I

MS. McDONALD:

And finally, your Honor, just a point

3

of clarification for Ms. DeLong's benefit.

4

have the impression that your kids would be coming home after

5

60 days.

6

everything, but there would still be some work the kids would

7

need to do before they would come home.

It would be wonderful if you complied with

8

MS. DeLONG:

9

MS. McDONALD:

10

I don't want you to

THE COURT:

I understand that.
Okay, thanks.

The other thing, Ms. DeLong, that you

11

probably need to know, we're telling you lots of stuff today,

12

these are really cute kids.

13

MS. DeLONG:

14

THE COURT:

15

MS. DeLONG:

16

Thank you.
Phillip is a doll, isn't he?
He is, he's my —

bug.

17

THE COURT:

He's a cute little boy.

18

cute too.

19

own, she'll be 18 soon.

20
21
22
23

I call him my cuddle

The girls are

The older girl is probably going to be out on her

MS. DeLONG:

Sara is very intelligent and I expect

her to have a very successful life,
THE COURT:
little bit sick.

Taylor is very sick.

He's been just a

Taylor is very sick.

24

MS. DeLONG:

25

THE COURT:

I realize that.
I think a part of it has to do with his

1

history, I think a part of it has to do with the domestic

2

violence that he observed and the insecurity that came into his

3

heart when he saw his mom and his dad having those kinds of

4

hard fights.

5

put into foster care and moved from a familiar environment into

6

a foster environment.

7

some real problems.

8

It's going to take us a long time to get him stabilized and

9

we'll need your help to do that.

I think a part of it has to do with when he was

10

MS. DeLONG:

11

THE COURT:

All of those things contribute to create
But right now he's a very sick little boy.

I'll do whatever I can.
He just needs to know that he's safe and

12

that he ! s loved and that that kind of violence will never

13

repeat itself.

14
15

MS. DeLONG:

That's my goal.

I don't ever want to do

that.

16

THE COURT:

Ms. McDonald, anything further?

17

MS. McDONALD:

No, your Honor, I'm just —

will the

18

service plan become part of the Court order once the Division

19

drafts it?

20

THE COURT:

Yes.

21

MS. McDONALD:

22

MR. ANGLEY:

Okay, thank you.

And, your Honor, can we have a time

23

frame for when that service plan will be put in place on the

24

record?

25

THE COURT:

I'm looking to whatever you

—
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1 only so much that one person who is not making a great deal
2

of money, there's only so much a person can do in a certain

3 period of time.
You know, she hasn't relapsed into poor

4
5

relationships.

She hasn't relapsed into any kind of alcohol

6

use.

7

illegal drug use, overuse of prescription drugs.

8

falling in with the wrong crowd.

9

any involvement with actions and activities that would

She hasn't pursued anything vis-a-vis drug use,

10

involved her with law enforcement.

11

right things.

She's staying away from

She's trying to do the

There's something that we call crawl, walk and

12
13

run.

14

my client to continue on the service plan.

And, Your Honor, I'm simply asking this Court to allow

THE COURT:

15
16

She's not

Thank you.

The concern that the Court had during

the prior adjudication was not so much the best interest as

•17 J it pertains to the children as it was the fact that the
18

mother had only been in jail for a short period of time and

19

I wasn't sure that she'd had a fair shot at being able to

20

comply with the service plan.
The Court found previously that, as contained in

21
22

its order and the minute entry that were entered after t h e —

23

after the last adjudication, and I want to say that was back

24

in August.

25

Was that back in August?
M S . PAGE:

It was, Your Honor.
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1

MR. BARRON:

2

THE COURT:

3 home at that point.

Yes, Your Honor.
That none of the children wanted to go

There were some concerns about the

4 ultimate placements, but none of the children expressed to
5 the Court a desire to return home under the current
6 circumstances, with the mother functioning the way that she
7 was.
And the Courtf s concern was that the mother had

8

9 not been out of jail for a substantial period of time and
10 was not sure that she'd had the opportunity of demonstrating
11 that she could resolve the underlying emotional problems.
12 The children, the Court found, had been abused physically,
13 had been abused emotionally, and were in a very sad and very
14 deplorable and neglectful condition, in terms of their
15 anxieties and their emotional stress.
The Court also found that the children had thrived

16

17 in foster care.

There's no evidence today to the contrary,

18 I that that -- that any of those underlying facts have
19 J changed.
20
21

The Court finds that the guardian ad litem has
demonstrated her motion by clear and convincing evidence.

22 Although this matter was only supposed to go for 60 days,
23
24
25

all parties agreed that it would go for 60 days, it has in
fact gone for twice that amount of time.
After hearing all of the evidence that was
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1 presented, the mother did enter her admission to the
2 petition and indicate that those facts were true and
3 correct.

Because of the concerns for the short amount of

4 time that she had to demonstrate her compliance with the
5 service plan, this matter was continued.
But the Court finds that the mother has failed to

6

7 stand up to her part of the bargain.

She's failed to take

8 the urinalysis, as required in my order that was issued and
9 verbally, as she was instructed from the bench, that she was
10 to phone in and take those UA's on a regular basis.

The

11 Court finds that she's only taken two to three of those,
12 albeit she has sufficient knowledge as to how to take the
f
13 UA s and was prompted to do so by the Division of Child &

14 Family Services.
The Court finds also that the mother's failed to

15

16 do the individual counseling.

The Court was very concerned

17 that Ms. Delong had a very concrete way of thinking, was not
18 sympathetic to the needs of the children, and that the
19 individual counseling was absolutely essential to avoid
20 further emotional neglect, physical abuse and becoming
21

involved with people that were harmful to her and to her

22 children.
23

The evidence has demonstrated that the mother has

24 only had a couple of sessions of individual counseling, and
25 it's uncontested that she has not been invited back and is
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1 not re-engaged in additional counseling.

She has a number

2 of explanations and excuses for that, but that has been the
3 history of this case, non-compliance and excuses.
4

Mother was ordered to have no contact with the

5 therapists for the children.
6 contact Ms. Berry.

It appears that she did

It does not appear that she was prompted

7 to do so by her own individual therapist.

It would be

8 unprecedented, this Court thinks, for those therapists to
9 request her to engage in that kind of behavior.
10 knows that therapists speak amongst themselves.

The Court
Therapists

11 also involve the Division of Child & Family Services.

It

12 would be unprecedented to involve a parent in this kind of a
13 circumstance and have the parent initiate that kind of
14 contact and try to set up the kind of family therapy, which
15 I know the mother has wanted but has been inconsistent with
16 individual therapy.
17

There is inadequate evidence to demonstrate that

18 she's capable of paying the rent and to provide for the
19 basic necessities of the children economically.

It doesn't

20 appear that she can meet those needs in terms of providing
21 food, transportation and necessities for the children, the
22 rent, as well as continue in the counseling.
23

The Court does not find that there has been any

24 significant progress on the service plan.
25

Court therefore accepts the mother's admission,
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1 finds that the mother has not complied with the stipulated
2 arrangement.

The Court finds that the petition is true and

3 correct that was originally filed by the Division of Child &
4 Family Services, and any right, title and interest that the
5 mother has and into Sara Hartwell, Rebecca Delong, Taylor
6 Delong or Phillip Delong should be and hereby are fully and
7 completely terminated, including residual parental rights.
8
9
10

I'll ask the guardian ad litem to prepare a factspecific order.
MS. McDONALD:

I will, Your Honor.

11

THE COURT:

We're in adjournment.

12

MS. PAGE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

13

(Whereupon, at the hour of 11:08 a.m.,

14
15

Thank you.

the proceedings were concluded.)
-oooOooo-

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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